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Abstract 
 
Critical evaluation is undertaken of the impacts of cognitive function tests upon the 
experience of men with dementia and their carers. There has been a strong biomedical 
focus on the efficacy of cognitive function tests, with little attention granted to their broader 
experiential effects. Primary data from a qualitative study are utilised to demonstrate these 
impacts. These are presented under four key themes: concerns with regard to the validity of 
tests; impacts upon self-esteem; shaping carers’ perceptions of the condition; and tests 
being viewed as a resource that is offered in the absence of more person-centred support. 
Further research, which specifically focuses on the experiential impacts of cognitive function 
assessments, is therefore required as a matter of urgency. 
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Introduction 
 
Dementia is a neurodegenerative condition that is associated with disturbance of multiple 
functions including language, comprehension, thinking and memory (Hughes, 2011). In the 
United Kingdom (UK) it is estimated that about 850,000 people have dementia (Alzheimer’s 
Society, 2014). A contributory resource available to the clinician when diagnosing and 
monitoring dementia is the cognitive function test1, using an instrument such as Mini-Mental 
State Examination (MMSE), Addenbrooke’s Cognitive Examination (ACE III), Montreal 
Cognitive Assessment (MOCA), or the Clock Drawing Test. This enables examination of 
factors such as short-term and long-term memory, concentration, language and executive 
function (NICE-SCIE, 2007, p.160). It should be noted that mental health professionals use 
a range of other assessment tools alongside cognitive function tests. For example, within the 
diagnostic process a resource such as MMSE is principally a screening tool that highlights 
whether further assessments are necessary.  
Cognitive function tests have received considerable (international) research scrutiny from 
a biomedical/psychiatric perspective. This is predominantly focused on an evaluation of the 
validity and reliability of testing procedures; for example, the value of tests to the clinician 
as a component of diagnostic and monitoring processes. Additionally, the aim is to seek a 
link between cognitive function and other behavioural symptoms or dispositional attributes. 
A selection of recent articles reinforces this point: Larner (2012) evaluates the utility of the 
                                                          
1 To avoid excessive repetition, the terms ‘cognitive function test’ and ‘cognitive function assessment’ are 
employed interchangeably in this article.  
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Montreal Cognitive Assessment as a screening instrument, alone and in combination with 
the MMSE; Milian et al, (2012) compare the effectiveness of the Mini-Cog, MMSE and the 
Clock Drawing Test within a memory clinic; Hausdorff & Buchman (2013) consider the links 
between gait speed and dementia with reference to measures of motor and cognitive 
function; Pavlik et al (2013) evaluate the link between insulin levels and cognitive function in 
people with Alzheimer’s disease; and Valyhudhan et al (2014) review the validity of a 
number of tests in different clinical settings. 
This biomedical focus on the efficacy and empirical utility of tests has been inadequately 
supplemented by research that considers the wider impacts of these assessments on their 
recipients’ well-being. The actual impact of tests upon people with dementia, and also their 
family members, has received very little academic consideration. This article sets out to 
address this shortcoming: evaluation of the experiential impacts of cognitive function tests is 
undertaken with reference to qualitative research that sought the views of men with 
dementia and their spousal carers. 
 
Literature context 
 
Experiential dimensions of cognitive function tests in biomedical literature 
 
As highlighted above, cognitive function tests receive intense scrutiny from a biomedical 
perspective, with the focus on the efficacy of instruments abstracted from their broader 
effects upon experience and relationships. However, clinically-oriented authors have 
acknowledged the experiential impacts of assessment practices:  
 
“Cognitive testing can be very upsetting for the person concerned. It reveals the 
person’s problems in a stark way. It needs to be undertaken with care and under 
the right circumstances. It is important that the things the person can still do 
should also be emphasized” (Hughes, 2011, p.88).  
 
In addition, it has been acknowledged that assessment scales should be of an acceptable 
format so that they do not “upset, exhaust or embarrass the patient or assessor” (Sheehan, 
2012, p.350). Nevertheless, such perspectives provide a very limited counterbalance to the 
one-sided focus on the scientific efficacy of assessment tools. It is notable that even a key 
introductory text for clinicians on cognitive assessments (Hodges, 2007) makes no reference 
to their potential experiential outcomes.  
This point is underscored with reference to a quantitative psychiatric study that did focus 
on the potential negative emotional impacts of testing processes. This study found that, 
following cognitive testing, some form of distress was present in 70% of a sample of 154 
patients with Alzheimer’s disease (Lai et al, 2008). The conclusion of this article however 
focuses on the prognostic significance of distress in determining appropriate interventions 
rather than seeking solutions with regard to how distress caused by testing processes could 
be mitigated. The orientation, even for a medically-oriented study on subjective distress, 
remains the enhancement of assessment efficacy rather than seeking to reduce their 
negative emotional impacts. 
 
Cognitive function tests in social scientific literature 
 
While the biomedical model has predominated, the experiential impacts of cognitive function 
assessments have received limited scrutiny within broader academic literature. Drawing 
upon data from qualitative interviews Keady & Gilliard (1999) highlight that assessment 
schedules are constructed on the basis of cognitive loss and assigning scores to the 
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measurement of incapacity, with the person with dementia situated as a passive recipient 
within this professional process: the focus of such tests is therefore intrinsically focused on 
impairment and deficit. In a later text the authors discuss how test participants were 
presented with insufficient information on the purpose and outcomes of the tasks that they 
were undertaking (Keady & Gilliard, 2002). 
Sabat (2001) argues that methods of assessment could be based more on the flow of 
natural social interaction so that remaining abilities are recognized, supported and even 
enhanced. This point is underscored in a later text which reports on a case study of a 
woman with Alzheimer’s disease: there could also be “dissociation between cognitive 
function as measured by standardised assessments and cognitive function as revealed in 
social situations” (Sabat & Gladstone, 2010, p.61).  
Endorsement of the potentially negative impact of testing upon self-worth is provided by 
Beard (2005) who undertook a qualitative study of the assessment process. Respondents 
depicted negative responses such as shame, disgust and disbelief during both the testing 
process and upon receiving the results.  
It is also important to recognise that current public policy in many countries is aimed at 
increasing the rates of diagnosis of dementia (Couteur et al, 2013). For example, in England 
‘Living Well with Dementia: a National Dementia Strategy’ aims to ensure that significant 
improvements are made to dementia services across key areas which include earlier 
diagnosis and intervention (Department of Health, 2009). Further to the perspective of Lai 
et al (2008) discussed under the previous heading, a recent study that evaluated the 
complete diagnostic process highlighted that: “Many experienced tests and assessments as 
distressing, sometimes in settings that were perceived as alarming or potentially 
stigmatising by association” (Manthorpe et al, 2013, e69). The policy endeavour to increase 
diagnosis rates, allied to the potential for cognitive testing processes to cause distress, 
emphasizes that the experiential impacts of assessment processes upon recipients must now 
begin to receive an appropriate degree of social scientific scrutiny. 
This article builds upon the perspectives of this literature but offers particular insights into 
how the experiential impacts of cognitive function tests extend beyond the actual site of 
assessment, shaping ongoing experience and relationship dynamics.  
 
Method 
 
Findings are utilised from a qualitative study that explores the experience of dementia for 
men with the condition, and their carers. Fourteen dyads were involved in the study2 (13 of 
the dyads were married mixed-sex couples, while one was same-sex and not married.) 
These couples took part in semi-structured joint interviews, with the person with dementia 
and carer interviewed together in the family home. Each set of respondents was interviewed 
on two occasions, with a six-month interval between interviews. This approach was 
employed to ensure greater depth of experiential insights. 
Only men with dementia were interviewed in the study (and all but one carer was 
female) which limits the gender-based transferability of the findings. Nevertheless, this 
design feature enables clear insights into how cognitive function tests impact upon men with 
dementia and their carers, and it also enables scrutiny of how cultural constructions of 
masculinity might shape the experience of cognitive function tests.  
Respondents were recruited via National Health Service (NHS) Trusts in England, and 
dementia support groups. The mean duration of the interviews was 70 minutes. There were 
no exclusion criteria with regard to the type of dementia: one participant had vascular 
dementia, and another had dementia with Lewy bodies. The other 12 men had Alzheimer’s. 
                                                          
2 Two carers were also interviewed on a one-to-one basis as the person with dementia did not have capacity to 
take part. Cognitive function tests were not discussed by either of these carers. 
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The age range of the men with dementia was 58 to 89; the age-range of the carers was 52 
to 84. One man with dementia was Afro-Caribbean, the rest of the sample was White-
British. Analysis of interview transcripts was undertaken with reference to narrative thematic 
analysis (Riessman, 2008). The principal researcher undertook close reading of the text and 
manual noting, which led to the identification of narrative themes.  
This research adopted a broad orientation, seeking respondent perspectives on 
relationship dynamics within the spousal dyad and other family members. Views were also 
sought on professional support that had been accessed, as well as plans to access support 
in the future. While the interviews covered the diagnostic process in general terms, there 
was no explicit intention to seek perspectives on cognitive function tests; that is, no 
question relating to these interventions was presented directly by the interviewer. Matters 
relating to these tests were therefore introduced independently by respondents in this 
study3. Experiential impacts of cognitive function tests were identified as a key theme in 
interviews with 10 of the 14 dyads. As this matter arose unprompted within a significant 
proportion of the sample, this presents an initial indication of the experiential resonance 
generated by this professional intervention.  
Table 1 summarises the characteristics of those dyads in the sample (10 out of 14) where 
experiential dimensions of cognitive function tests were identified to present particular 
significance. There were no clear patterns differentiating those who directly raised such 
matters and those that did not i.e. with reference to participants’ ages or the time that has 
elapsed since diagnosis.  
Table 1: Dyad characteristics (at date of first interview) 
Man Age Carer Age Time since 
diagnosis  
Type of 
dementia 
Oliver 58 Elizabeth 55 Six months Alzheimer’s 
David 64 Florence 52 Six months Alzheimer’s 
Timothy 64 Martin 56 Six months Lewy body 
Nicholas 66 Caroline 67 One year Alzheimer’s 
James 67 Irene 66 Two years Alzheimer’s 
Simon 75 Sally 64 One year Alzheimer’s 
Robert 76 Rachel 73 One month Alzheimer’s 
John 82 Anne 74 Three years Vascular 
Sam 83 Eleanor 77 Three years Alzheimer’s 
Marcus 89 Michelle 84 Five years Alzheimer’s 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
3 Respondents did not state the particular mode of test that was undertaken, but it is clear from the presented 
data that they are referring to some form of cognitive function assessment: if tests are not mentioned directly 
then participants refer to the types of question asked, or scores/points associated with the intervention.  
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Findings and discussion: experiential impacts of cognitive function 
tests4  
 
Questioning the validity of tests 
 
A feature of cognitive function tests that raised queries from respondents related to validity; 
that is, how accurately tests represented functioning and abilities. This was highlighted by 
Florence: she felt that her partner was practically orientated and that, even prior to the 
onset of dementia, he would not have been dispositionally suited to the abstract nature of 
cognitive assessments: 
 
“I think there are certain people who will never have been able to do those 
tests terribly well. And I found it quite fascinating really because I don’t think 
David even at the top of his mental ability, they were things that he could 
have done, he just didn’t have that processing sort of capability [...] That’s 
what slightly worries me about the diagnostic side of things, that you think, ‘is 
it that he never had the skill?” 
       (Florence – carer)  
   
This also suggests that there is a possibility that people with dementia could find the 
process of testing frustrating if they do not have the disposition or aptitude for such tests. 
The cognitive function test highlights specific limitations, even though the person with 
dementia might have a range of other skills and abilities.  
Another carer Irene stated that particular test conditions hinder her partner from 
responding in a way that captures his knowledge level. Irene suggested that her partner 
was uneasy with the process:  the following quote commences with her stating the type of 
question that causes him to worry: 
 
“Who’s the Queen?’ you know. And he looks to me to see who the Queen is. But he does 
know who the Queen is, but they worry him asking him. If you asked him, cos he knows 
you, or I did ‘What’s the Queen’s name?’ – ‘Elizabeth of course’, thinking ‘What did you 
ask me that for, is she doing a crossword?’ You know, ‘Why’s she asking me? I know very 
well who the Queen is’. But when this lovely lady asked him, he hadn’t got a clue” 
         (Irene – carer) 
    
Alternatively, it is perceived by Caroline that her partner’s disposition to undertake 
cognitive tests to a high standard (as a consequence of his previous employment as a 
teacher) might have contributed to delays in diagnosis: 
 
“You had 99 out of a hundred, so that was good. And I said to them you can 
give him these questions all you like, he’s used to it; that was his job”  
        (Caroline – carer) 
 
Guidance for health and social care professionals in the UK underscores that multiple 
factors will shape the outcome of tests, including the person with dementia’s educational 
level, language and prior level of attainment (NICE-SCIE, 2007), and such limitations with 
regard to MMSE have been recognised for some time (e.g. Anthony et al, 1982). The 
                                                          
4 Names of respondents and professionals have been changed. An ellipsis inside square brackets shows that 
some text has been removed from a quote. This is to assist with the presentation of data, it does not alter the 
meaning of responses. The ‘cleaning’ of text is consistent with narrative approaches (Riessman, 2008). 
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findings of this study raise a query as to whether professional knowledge on the nature of 
assessments (for example, that assessments offer circumscribed insights into cognitive 
functioning, which are mediated by multiple factors) is cascaded to the point of the clinical 
intervention. The interview excerpts above show carers concerned that extraneous factors 
will shape assessment outcomes, rendering the results questionable. This perhaps shows 
that these concerns could have been more effectively assuaged by professionals managing 
the diagnostic or monitoring process. Further to the findings of Keady & Gilliard (2002), it 
appears that people with dementia and their carers still remain insufficiently well informed 
with regard to the nature and purpose of tests.  
        
Impacting on self-worth 
 
Perspectives expressed within this study demonstrated that cognitive function tests have the 
capacity to pose a challenge to the self-worth of the person with dementia. Oliver’s 
statement below offers a clear demonstration of the potential impact of tests upon the 
participant’s self-concept: 
  
“When the nurse came out and she tested me that’s when I realised how bad 
I was. It shocked me a bit” 
     (Oliver – person with dementia) 
 
It has been highlighted that people might not attribute their situation to the neurological 
manifestations of dementia, but that the process of diagnosis can lead to them being 
socialised into perceiving forgetfulness, or other personal changes, as symbolic of disease 
(Beard & Fox, 2008). The aforementioned quote perhaps indicates the initial stages of this 
process of socialisation for Oliver. 
David also expressed disquiet about his initial test performances, before proceeding to 
assert how he has improved:  
 
“They gave me tests and for the first couple of, the first two or three tests I 
really struggled [...] I suppose once they actually, definitely diagnosed that 
I’d got early stages of Alzheimer’s, at that point they began to input with 
drugs. Things like that which gave me a lot of security and made me feel a lot 
happier and I felt that I wasn’t as dim as I thought I was [laughs]. Because I 
really had a bad time before this happened. I was really struggling and felt 
embarrassed about struggling. But the girls that have come out to me [...] 
they’ve put me on different tests and as I work through the tests I’ve got 
better and better at working out the tests. In fact the last test I had I think I 
got 34 out of 35”  
                    (David – person with dementia) 
     
Tests appear to have informed the diagnostic process. David is therefore now taking 
medication and this, allied to a sense of clarity on his condition, seems to have made a 
positive impact. However, this process also appears to have contributed to a sense that 
David considered himself to be defective to some extent, and (further to Beard, 2005) such 
imposed definitions could lead to a subjective feeling of shame. As tests can elicit intensely 
negative emotional reactions, this powerfully emphasizes that consideration of the 
experiential dimensions of cognitive function tests must be embedded within diagnostic and 
monitoring processes.  
It is notable that, while cognitive function tests received significant scrutiny from 
respondents, assessments such as brain scans tended to be discussed briefly and in neutral, 
descriptive terms. For example, David referred to how the scan was used to confirm that he 
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had dementia, but this particular intervention did not appear to present the same threat to 
his sense of self-worth. In a similar fashion to cognitive function tests, the findings from a 
brain scan could demonstrate the impact of dementia in stark terms. However, as concerns 
with scans were not expressed by participants in this research this suggests that difficulties 
with assessment processes do not simply relate to indications of decline. A brain scan is 
focused on a biological level of existence that resides to some extent beneath the expression 
of interactionally expressed abilities, while cognitive function assessments measure facets of 
being that relate directly to socially-articulated personal identity. That is, they are conducted 
within the social domain of human relationships where personhood can be undermined 
(personhood is discussed under the next heading). 
In the excerpt above, David also discussed how his test scores have improved and 
appears to draw confidence from this situation. The fact that he specifically refers to his 
improvement in these tests indicates how the assessment process had impacted negatively 
upon his self-esteem. Renewed confidence related to this improvement potentially presents 
further problems as he is using an increased test score to bolster his sense of competence 
and self-worth. However, this generates a situation whereby the negative emotional impacts 
of a reduced score in the future might be felt acutely. When self-worth becomes coupled 
with the outcome of a quantitative test, this presents an ongoing challenge and accordingly 
a threat to the person with dementia’s emotional well-being. Assessment predicated on a 
deficit model therefore presents issues whether scores decrease or increase. 
Sam also discussed his capacity to complete tests with a high score. This again presents 
a situation whereby a reduced score in future tests could erode feelings of personal worth, 
particularly as the assessment involves a seemingly cherished skill:   
 
“The nurse would give you 100 questions you know, and I could almost get 
them all right. I could get 90 odd, 99 a couple of times. Asking where you are 
and all this, then they get you doing mental arithmetic. But I was always 
pretty good at maths and I could get 90 odd every time”  
                   (Sam – person with dementia).  
     
The quote below shows another response to a cognitive function test that might relate to 
the defence of self-worth: 
 
Anne: “He gave him a test of write down all the words beginning with ‘p’. Well 
he expected him to put ‘pot’, ‘pan’, ‘pie’. No, he put ‘physiotherapist’, 
‘physician’ and Kevin [health professional] was just absolutely gob-
smacked […] So he said to him, ‘Can’t you think of a simple word 
beginning with ‘p’?’ and John just went, ‘Yeah well, okay, “piddle”’ 
[laughs].” 
John: “What else?” 
 
Anne highlights how John was able to perform at a level that exceeded the expectations 
of the clinician. John does not elaborate on his reaction to the testing process. Nevertheless, 
his approach to the test could be a means by which he sought to retain control over the 
process: being asked a relatively simple question could potentially have challenged his sense 
of self-worth, so his proposal of complex words beginning with ‘p’ demonstrates the extent 
of his enduring capabilities. 
Such reactions also prompt the requirement to recognise how cognitive function 
assessments relate to broader experiential factors. One such overlapping theme identified in 
this study was ‘skills and competence’. Men offered examples of how skills had been 
retained, or by presented accounts of former activities which demonstrated their abilities 
(often related to employment). It is also crucial to note how gender might intersect with the 
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experience of cognitive function tests. Labels associated with illness related to passivity, 
dependence and a subordinated status (Charmaz, 1994) clash with societal notions of 
masculinity, which are predicated on autonomy and competence. While generalisations 
should be avoided (and factors relating to skills and competence will be important to women 
as well) men might feel particular pressures as a consequence of cultural expectations 
associated with masculinity: being good at what you do is a strong masculine-gendered trait 
(Coston & Kimmel, 2013, p.197). A positive self-concept associated with productive labour 
could be of particular salience to men: aspects of identity related to personal competence 
might therefore be significantly challenged by the process of cognitive function assessments.  
 
Shaping perceptions of carers  
 
Perceptions of the person with dementia’s functioning and abilities are also shaped by 
cognitive function tests. For example, carers might be heartened by a score in a cognitive 
test, particularly if it is an improvement on a previous test. This situation is reminiscent of 
David’s improved scores discussed under the previous heading. Sally highlighted how happy 
she was with her partner’s score in a recent test:  
 
“About every six months he goes back [to the hospital]. And they do the 
memory test. Because the last time we were quite thrilled weren’t we, 
because he got 26 out of 30. So he’s better. But he’s still on his medication”  
               (Sally – carer) 
 
While a good test score can have positive emotional effects, this raises implications for 
the impact of future tests: increased scores offer a fragile reassurance that is at risk of being 
punctured. An improved score could place the person with dementia and their carer in a 
precarious emotional position underpinned by a hope, with regard to the anticipated 
trajectory of the illness, which is unlikely to be reinforced by further cognitive assessments. 
It has been argued that an important part of the assessment process should be instilling 
hope in the lives of people with dementia and their carers (Keady & Gilliard, 2002). 
However, the nature of hope in relation to cognitive function tests requires more extensive 
consideration. The findings from this study indicate that cognitive function tests can actually 
generate a form of hope that lacks sufficiently credible foundations: ongoing testing as part 
of monitoring processes tethers hope precariously to the score of a narrow, quantified 
deficit-model of assessment.  
The score from a cognitive function test also offers a resource by which the condition can 
be understood and defined by the carer. In the quote below a carer highlights that scores in 
monitoring tests have diminished and then juxtaposes this with the increase of personal 
support that is now required. While this might be a reasonable inference to make in this 
instance, it does show how cognitive function scores are used to make sense of the carer’s 
situation and to some extent label the person with dementia’s behaviour: 
 
“He had dropped by about three points on that which was okay, Fiona [health 
professional] said understandable. But he’s just had the other one last week, 
the next six-month one and he dropped another three points, so we are down 
into the teens now with it and of course things change [...] He’s needing 
more help with, well, a lot of things, a lot of prompting with the clothes going 
on back-to-front and all those things you expect with dementia”  
        (Martin – carer) 
 
A further example is presented by Rachel who draws upon the score of a test to confirm 
her prior assumptions of her partner’s decline. This also demonstrates how the results of a 
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test can be interpreted with reference to the frame of deficit and decline. This might orient 
carers towards how the test outcome reflects declining function, rather than how remaining 
faculties and abilities can be encouraged and sustained. The following quote also 
demonstrates a direct comparison with another individual’s score. Such comparisons are 
problematic, as extraneous factors (such as educational background) will shape test 
outcomes: 
 
“Robert has been to the memory clinic and had a memory test. I know that 
our friend was 19 out of 30 and I’d always said that Robert would be worse 
and he was. He was 16 out of 30 which is very bad” 
        (Rachel – carer) 
 
A cognitive function test therefore ascribes a quantitative marker to the person with 
dementia’s situation. A test showing reduced scores might therefore prompt queries over 
capacity and abilities to a greater degree than the influence of the dementia requires. Carers 
might also act in a manner shaped by the score of a cognitive function test, underplaying (or 
overstating) their partner’s abilities.  
The focus on cognitive function scores is compatible with the understanding of dementia 
as a biomedical phenomenon; that is, as a terminal condition defined by neurodegenerative 
changes. However, the person with dementia’s experiential domain is not only determined 
by neurological factors: people with dementia retain an intrinsic personhood that should be 
respected, and that experience can be enhanced by adjusting interactions and the 
environment so that this personhood can be more effectively articulated. Personhood is thus 
shaped by the context of personal relationships and is even conceived as a status bestowed 
upon the individual by others (Kitwood, 1997). Therefore, the responses of carers and other 
family members to a perceived label conferred by a cognitive function test could have 
significant implications for the person with dementia.  
Such a perceived label might have particular resonance when intersecting with the 
experience of those negotiating the biographical disruption (Bury, 1982) prompted by the 
onset of dementia. It is important to note that cognitive function tests are likely to have 
taken place within a more extensive and discursive clinical interaction. Nevertheless, despite 
this broader context, the process of testing still has particular experiential salience for 
carers. When faced with a disruptive and disorientating situation, a test which applies a 
discrete quantitative score to the condition offers certain clarity and this accordingly elevates 
perceptions of the test score’s significance. A clear numerical indicator places a neat and 
tangible definition upon complex and demanding personal circumstances, as well as 
presenting a tangible point of comparison across the monitoring process.  
Under certain circumstances, however, changes to a person with dementia’s behaviour 
might relate to factors that have no correlation (or a mediated correlation) with a cognitive 
function test score. This score could therefore have a direct impact upon the person with 
dementia, by focusing on their personal limitations. In addition, relational and contextual 
factors could be influenced by the results of an assessment, as a result of the carer and 
family members also responding to the test outcome. The assessment process could actively 
contribute to negative social conditions that compound the challenges encountered by 
people with dementia. This relates to the concept ‘malignant positioning’ (Sabat, 2001): by 
employing a deficit model, cognitive function tests have the scope to contribute to malignant 
positioning, by focusing attention on the deleterious impacts of the condition. Presenting an 
indication of cognitive decline in such a stark manner could obscure recognition of other 
elements of the person’s identity, and the breadth of social personae that underpin their 
personhood. 
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Indicating a lack of person-centred support 
 
Perspectives presented in this research also suggest that a lack of socially-oriented support 
could lead to the narrow and functional process of cognitive assessment being viewed as the 
central component of professional input. This relates to the principle of person-centred care. 
Professional support needs to recognise that dementia cannot be understood solely with 
reference to its biological basis. The personhood of the person with dementia needs to be 
supported and it is therefore crucial to account for the psychological and sociological 
dimensions of the condition (Brooker, 2007). 
While presenting a stoical view that not much additional assistance could be offered, 
Michelle highlights the limited and repetitive nature of professional interventions that she 
encounters with her partner: 
 
“We did get an appointment at the centre where he goes three times a week; 
we went there to see a person. But it was the usual thing; they draw a clock 
and put the numbers on. Exactly the same things you do every time. Suppose 
there’s nothing else you can do really” 
         (Michelle – carer) 
 
A similar perspective is demonstrated by Irene below. She discusses how their new 
healthcare arrangements do not compare favourably with previous support. Whereas 
support formerly had a social basis, now all that appears to be offered is an assessment that 
is perceived to offer little utility. The fact that Irene refers to the previous health 
professional by name on three occasions in this excerpt indicates that an interpersonal 
affinity was forged with this professional. This contrasts with the more impersonal and test-
based input that is now offered: 
 
“They don’t do anything. We just go once a year and they ask you to spell 
‘world’ backwards or something trivial like that. But when the girls used to 
come out to him, Melanie [health professional] used to come, oh he loved 
Melanie. She used to come and have a cup of tea with him and it was lovely 
and he related to Melanie”  
        (Irene – carer) 
 
This shows an association of cognitive tests with a lack of broader support that could 
address more personal and experiential requirements. Tests appear to be regarded as a task 
undertaken by the professional in the absence of more socially-oriented input. As a 
consequence the compatibility of cognitive function tests with principles of personhood and 
person-centred care can be queried: an excessive focus on measures of cognitive processing 
could marginalise recognition of the significance of social and relational dimensions of the 
person with dementia’s support requirements. This view is in accordance with Manthorpe et 
al (2013) who also found that those undergoing assessments did not experience them as 
patient-centred.  
 
Conclusion  
 
Evaluation of the experiential impacts of cognitive function tests demonstrates that these 
assessments present manifold implications for people with dementia and their carers. 
Cognitive function tests can: prompt concerns with regard to their validity; generate 
embarrassment and worry; inflate a sense of hope that is unlikely to be sustained by further 
testing; present a quantitative marker that might excessively shape perceptions of the 
condition; and be viewed as a resource that is offered in the absence of more socially-
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oriented support. These findings highlight that the role of assessments should be aligned 
with greater professional awareness of experiential impacts of these tests. Hopes, self-
esteem, concerns and worries can become anchored to these discrete totals, and 
fluctuations in performance are presented in stark terms.  
Cognitive function tests should not therefore be viewed as discrete assessment tools: 
attention needs to be directed to understanding their broader impacts upon the well-being 
of people with dementia. The multiple and varied experiential impacts of cognitive function 
tests highlighted in this research demonstrate that it is inappropriate for these tests to 
reside almost exclusively within one particular mode of professional discourse i.e. the 
biomedical model.  
Under the current clinical approach to cognitive function testing, there is a clear 
requirement for the nature and implications of tests to be communicated effectively to 
people with dementia and their carers. This includes conveying the circumscribed role that 
testing plays within diagnostic and monitoring processes. Appropriate communication could 
thus help to ameliorate the experiential effects of cognitive function tests.  As noted above, 
tests are only a contributory resource within broader interventions. Cascading this actuality 
more clearly can help people with dementia and their carers to recognise that testing does 
not comprise the central component of professional input. 
In addition, the intensive experiential impacts highlighted in this article indicate that the 
present approach to cognitive function testing warrants scrutiny in itself. Following Sabat 
(2001), tests which are more socially and practically oriented could offer the scope to 
evaluate the impacts of dementia without placing such direct scrutiny on narrow cognitive 
performance. Even if performance and capabilities decline, the focus would remain on what 
the person is able to do, rather than on the numerical outcome of a test.  
Although this research did not set out to evaluate cognitive function tests directly, the 
experiential impacts of these assessments were vividly conveyed. It is therefore insufficient 
that cognitive function tests should be scrutinised solely with reference to their 
measurement validity and reliability; the way that these tests make people feel should also 
be closely scrutinised. Accordingly, cognitive function tests require broader scrutiny beyond 
a focus on their scientific efficacy. This research has shown that the process of cognitive 
function testing can potentially exacerbate the challenges of living with dementia. Research 
that adopts a direct focus on the experiential impacts of cognitive function tests upon people 
with dementia and their family members is therefore required as a matter of urgency. 
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